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INTRODUCTION  
n many respects, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 marked the 
beginning of a new era. It forcefully demonstrated that today’s fi-
nancial markets pose extremely serious potential risks to every national 
economy as well as the entire global economic system. What started in-
itially as tremors in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, in a matter of 
months, turned into a full-blown turmoil that nearly incapacitated the 
global financial system and resulted in massive economic and social dis-
location in virtually every corner of the world.1 It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the crisis brought to the forefront of the public policy de-
bate the need for a fundamental reform of the existing system of regula-
tion and supervision of the financial services sector. The objectives, 
scope, and elements of such wide-reaching financial regulatory reforms 
are at the heart of intense ongoing discussions among policy-makers, 
academics, and industry experts in the U.S.2 and abroad.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 1. There is a vast and growing body of academic literature detailing the causes, 
timeline, and consequences of the recent financial crisis, in the context of specific coun-
tries, regions, or the international economy as a whole. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen 
Ferrell & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising From 2007-2008 
Credit Crisis 1, 5 (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper, Paper No. 612, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1096582; Yuliya S. Demyanyk & 
Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, (Dec. 5, 2008), availa-
ble at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396&rec=1&srcabs=1096582; 
Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter,  Systemic Risk Through 
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 
(2009); Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 15 (2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1320704. 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/report/blueprint.pdf; Markus Brunnermeier, et al.,  
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation ix (Int’l Ctr. for Monetary and Banking 
Studies, Prelim. Conf. Draft, Jan. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/reports/Geneva11.pdf; CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009), 
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf; 
GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009), 
available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/pub_1460.htm; U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING 
PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM GAO-
09-216 (Jan. 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. On July 21, 2010, 
I 
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Numerous proposals, coming from the official sector and various non-
governmental sources in response to the crisis, have advocated regulatory 
reforms of differing magnitude.4 Such proposed reform measures gener-
ally range from a complete overhaul of the regulatory structure to more 
discrete steps aimed at regulating specific market products or segments.5 
The majority of these proposals focus primarily on designing the struc-
ture of the regulatory and supervisory apparatus in the financial sector 
and reallocating functions among various government agencies oversee-
ing financial markets. To the extent these proposals deal with substantive 
revisions to the existing regulatory scheme, they tend to focus on regula-
tion of specific products or market participants, such as over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) derivatives or credit rating agencies, directly implicated in the 
crisis. Many substantive reform proposals seek to strengthen some of the 
existing regulatory tools, such as capital adequacy or liquidity require-
ments applicable to banks and other regulated financial institutions. 
Many proposals also call for closer and more effective coordination and 
cooperation among national financial regulatory and supervisory authori-
ties and creation of transnational regulatory bodies whose primary task 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, which incorporated many of the ideas advanced in various reform pro-
posals. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 
4173, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf. 
 3. For key proposals debated in the United Kingdom, see, e.g., HER MAJESTY’S 
TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf; FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 4. In July 2010, U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act introducing significant 
changes in the existing system of financial sector regulation and supervision. See supra 
note 2. Although frequently referred to as the most sweeping financial sector reform in 
the United States since the New Deal, the Dodd-Frank Act leaves many fundamental 
policy issues to be resolved through the regulatory agencies’ action in implementing the 
statute’s broadly phrased mandates. See, e.g., Stacy Kaper, Now for the Hard Part: The 
Top Five Challenges of Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, July 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_139/now-for-the-hard-part-1022715-1.html. 
This Article’s primary focus is not on the details of the Dodd-Frank Act, or any other 
specific legislative or regulatory proposal, but rather on the key trends in the broader 
debate on financial regulation reform in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. 
 5. See supra note 2. For critical analyses of the key trends in the debate, see, e.g., 
Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 39 (2009); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institu-
tions: A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009). 
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would be detection and prevention of systemic risk in the financial sec-
tor.6 
These reform proposals tackle extremely important issues and contain 
a wide range of highly valuable and insightful ideas, some of which are 
incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.7 
However, despite the depth and diversity of current approaches to 
reform, neither the newly adopted U.S. reform legislation nor the broader 
theoretical discussions on the future of financial sector regulation address 
explicitly one vitally important issue: the role of industry self-regulation 
in the post-crisis world of finance.8 This Article seeks to cure this omis-
sion by bringing the problem of self-regulation into the focus of the on-
going policy debate. 
The recent crisis has profoundly changed the face of the global finan-
cial industry. Some of the biggest players in the financial markets ceased 
to exist as independent enterprises,9 while others came perilously close to 
failure and had to be rescued by their governments.10 The public opinion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 6. Systemic risk may be defined as a “risk that a disturbance will impair the efficient 
functioning of the financial system and, at the extreme, cause its complete breakdown.” 
See Kimberly Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach 
to Understanding Derivatives, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 47 (1997). For an in-depth treat-
ment of the nature of systemic risk in the financial sector, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). 
 7. See supra note 2. 
 8. Recently, a few legal scholars began incorporating the notion of self-regulation in 
their reform proposals. See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Brack-
et?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 836 (2010) (proposing an 
industry organization comprising systemically important financial institutions and de-
signed specifically to provide a cost-sharing mechanism in the event of a financial crisis); 
Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating Credit Default Swaps in the Battle of 
Man vs. the Gods of Risk (March 16, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572467 (proposing an establishment 
of a self-regulatory organization focusing on the regulation of credit default swaps). 
However, these recent proposals tend to focus on specific areas of potential application of 
a more traditional concept of a self-regulatory organization rather than a broader shift in 
the paradigm of financial industry self-regulation. 
 9. The best-known examples in this respect are two venerable U.S. investment 
banks: Bear Stearns, which was acquired by J.P. Morgan, and Lehman Brothers, which 
was forced into bankruptcy in September 2008. 
 10. For instance, as a result of its bail-out efforts, the U.K. government currently 
owns more than 70% of shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland. See HM TREASURY, 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND: DETAILS OF ASSET PROTECTION SCHEME AND LAUNCH OF 
ASSET PROTECTION AGENCY (2009), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/rbs_aps_apa.pdf. Similarly, as of April 2010, the U.S. government 
owned about 27% of Citigroup’s stock. See Treasury Plans First Citigroup Stock Sale, 
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around the world turned decidedly anti-industry,11 especially amid the 
revelations that the firms that received taxpayers’ money to help them 
stay afloat granted their executives and traders lavish bonuses.12 The pre-
vailing theoretical and ideological paradigm, which viewed deregulation 
of financial activities and financial innovation as unconditionally benefi-
cial,13 has been publicly discredited and lost its pre-crisis intellectual 
dominance.14 In light of these developments, it may seem counter-
intuitive, if not outright misguided, to suggest that part of the solution is 
giving more regulatory power to the very industry that manufactured the 
crisis. 
Nevertheless, this Article argues that any meaningful long-term regula-
tory reform in the financial services sector must seriously consider the 
potential role of industry self-regulation as a key mechanism of control-
ling and minimizing systemic risk. Industry self-regulation has two im-
portant potential advantages over both direct government regulation of 
the financial services sector and pure market-based regulatory mechan-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
WASH. POST, April 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/26/treasury-plans-first-citigroup-stock-
sale/. 
 11. Matt Taibbi’s famous quote describing Goldman Sachs as “a great vampire squid 
wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything 
that smells like money” provides one of the most vivid, albeit extreme, examples of the 
strong anti-industry public opinion. Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, 
THE ROLLING STONE, July 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/29127316/the_great_american_bubble_machi
ne/print. 
  In November 2009, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein’s ill-timed statement 
that he was “doing God’s work” spurred a wave of small but vocal public protests around 
the country. See Kevin Sieff, Protesters Lash Out at Goldman, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2009. 
 12. Thus, in late 2009, it was reported that Goldman Sachs was setting aside $16.7 
billion for compensation in the first nine months of 2009, after earning record profits in a 
sharp rebound from financial turmoil. See Francesco Guerrera & Justin Baer, Goldman 
Apologises for Role in Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009. 
 13. See, e.g., Peter Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008; Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima & Jill Drew, What Went Wrong, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 14. Thus, the former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (the\ Federal Reserve), Alan Greenspan, perhaps the most famous proponent of 
this philosophy, publicly admitted its fundamental mistake in essentially assuming risks 
away. See Alan Greenspan, We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2008. Interestingly, a world-famous financier, George Soros, recently an-
nounced his decision to fund a new think tank whose mission would be to re-conceive the 
field of economics, which is too deeply entrenched in the free-market ideology. See Alan 
Rappeport, Soros to Invest $50m in Economic Think-tank, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e45b353a-c2f3-11de-8eca-00144feab49a.html. 
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isms. One such potential advantage is the industry’s superior ability to 
access and assess, in a timely and efficient manner, the relevant market 
information. This informational advantage is critical to effective regula-
tion of the increasingly complex financial markets and activities. The 
other potential advantage of private industry actors over government 
regulators is their ability to monitor and regulate their own business op-
erations on a truly global basis, without regard to national borders and 
jurisdictional limitations. Financial globalization, which poses serious 
challenges for government agencies constrained by their formal jurisdic-
tional mandates, makes a seamlessly integrated approach to regulating 
financial activities across national borders an indispensable condition for 
effective reduction of systemic risk. 
However, in order to realize these potential advantages, the very foun-
dation of the concept of self-regulation in the financial services industry 
has to be revisited. As this Article argues, the currently existing system 
of self-regulation in the U.S. securities industry falls far short of a model 
that fully utilizes the potential benefits of private industry regulation. The 
statutorily authorized system of securities self-regulatory organizations, 
or SROs, serves mainly as the means of delegating certain narrowly 
drawn governmental functions to the industry and occupies an awkward 
position between the government and private sector.15 The U.S. securities 
SROs were not designed to address effectively the issues of systemic risk 
control in today’s financial markets.16 Accomplishing this goal by leve-
raging financial sector’s self-regulatory potential requires a fundamental 
shift in the very paradigm of financial industry self-regulation, its pur-
pose, scope, and the broader institutional context within which it oper-
ates. 
As the first step in this direction, this Article argues for a new model of 
financial sector self-regulation, one that focuses explicitly on prevention 
of systemic failure and is firmly embedded in the broader public interests 
and policy goals. This new normative approach to self-regulation in the 
financial services sector—what this Article refers to as “embedded self-
regulation”—seeks to redefine the broader social role of the private fi-
nancial sector and impose the primary responsibility for guarding finan-
cial stability against excessive risks directly on the financial services in-
dustry that created them. Importantly, this approach recognizes that a 
strong and effective system of government regulation, which defines key 
policy objectives and monitors performance of self-regulatory institu-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 15. See, e.g., Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008). 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
2010] RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF SELF REGULATION 671 
tions, is critical to the proper functioning of financial sector self-
regulation. This Article argues that an effective model of embedded self-
regulation should serve as an important supplement to the ongoing quest 
for an optimal design of the government regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and activities. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets broader theoretical context 
for further discussion by highlighting some of the key insights that the 
growing body of academic literature on New Governance has to offer 
with respect to the general nature of regulatory challenges in the 21st 
century. It also addresses some of the principal definitional issues in the 
ongoing academic debate on self-regulation. Part II shifts focus directly 
to self-regulation in the financial sector. It examines the rationale for the 
renewed importance of industry self-regulation in the wake of the recent 
global financial crisis and argues that financial sector self-regulation has 
significant potential benefits from the perspective of managing global 
systemic risk. Part III analyzes the limitations of the currently existing 
system of the U.S. securities SROs and proposes a new concept of “em-
bedded self-regulation,” which represents a fundamental shift in the 
normative basis for self-regulation in the financial sector. Finally, the 
Article ends with brief concluding remarks. 
I. NEW GOVERNANCE AND SELF-REGULATION 
Self-regulation as a form of social organization has a long history, 
which can be traced back to religious fraternities and medieval merchant 
and trade guilds.17 In today’s world, self-regulatory regimes exist in a 
variety of different areas, including professional self-regulation in law 
and medicine, private accreditation and product certification schemes, 
and formal self-regulatory organizations in many industries. It is hardly 
surprising that, given the wide variety of self-regulatory institutions, the 
meaning of the term “self-regulation” defies simple definitions. This Part 
seeks to place the search for a new self-regulatory model in the financial 
sector in a broader intellectual and theoretical context by outlining the 
ongoing debate on New Governance approaches to regulatory issues. It 
also addresses some of the definitional and conceptual complexities in 
the academic debate on self-regulation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 17. See, e.g., SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS: OUTDATED 
SYSTEM OR WORK IN PROGRESS? 1 (CFA Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. Integrity, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2007.n7.4819. 
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A. New Governance Theories: A Brief Overview 
Legal scholars and social scientists working within the so-called New 
Governance paradigm have long recognized the fundamental inadequacy 
of a purely top-down, centralized state regulation of complex systems.18 
Working across many academic disciplines and analyzing regulatory 
processes in various empirical settings,19 these scholars generally argue 
that the complexity and fluidity of informational flows in today’s society 
pose insurmountable challenges to so-called command and control regu-
lation.20 Thus, one of the central criticisms aimed at the top-down regula-
tory approaches, whereby the government exercises full monopoly on 
making and enforcing the rules, is that the government “has insufficient 
knowledge to be able to identify the causes of problems, to design solu-
tions that are appropriate, and to identify non-compliance (information 
failure).”21 In addition, the failings of the government regulation include 
the inability to design appropriately sophisticated and effective legal and 
policy instruments to address complex social problems (instrument fail-
ure), inadequate implementation of the rules (implementation failure), 
and failure to motivate the regulated entities and individuals to comply 
with the rules (motivational failure).22 
While these criticisms are often directed at what may be viewed as a 
caricature of direct government regulation, rather than a far more com-
plex reality of how state and non-state actors interact in making and im-
plementing rules and regulations,23 they bring home a fundamentally im-
portant point. Relying on the government as the sole source of regulation 
applicable to complex systems, including the global financial system, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 18. See e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal; The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). For a cross-
disciplinary review of New Governance scholarship, see Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & 
Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current 
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 19. For a recent overview of the governance scholarship across various academic 
disciplines, see VASUDHA CHHOTRAY & GERRY STOKER, GOVERNANCE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH (2009). 
 20. The term “command and control regulation” generally denotes a strictly centra-
lized system of government rule-making and enforcement. See, e.g., Darren Sinclair, Self-
Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW & POL’Y 
529, 531–32 (1997). 
 21. Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 106 
(2001). 
 22. Id. 
 23. The New Governance scholarship generally recognizes that a pure form of com-
mand and control regulation does not exist in practice, much like there is no pure form of 
complete private industry self-regulation. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 20, at 531–32. 
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suffers from the important built-in handicaps of informational asymmetry 
and expertise deficit. These handicaps are likely to render financial regu-
lation inherently reactive, rather than proactive, and thus incapable of 
addressing financial systemic risk ex ante, as opposed to trying to reme-
dy it ex post. 
The New Governance scholars seek to understand how regulatory de-
cisions are made in practice and how both power and responsibility are 
allocated among different public and private actors interacting in real 
life. One of the key insights of this school of thought is the realization 
that regulation is a multi-layered process that takes place on many differ-
ent levels and in many different fora.24 It recognizes that technological 
progress and advances in communication fundamentally change the very 
context in which regulation operates by creating a new demand for open-
ness and encouraging self-regulation by private actors empowered to act 
collectively and to form norm-generating institutions.25 
However, it is important to emphasize that the New Governance scho-
lars do not simply advocate dismantling the regulatory state in favor of 
free market and purely private mechanisms of social ordering.26 Propo-
nents of the New Governance approach view the world as a complex, 
dynamic, and intricately interconnected system in which multiple go-
vernmental and non-governmental forces constantly negotiate, and rene-
gotiate, the boundaries between public and private spheres of economic 
and social life.27 In this world, the key objective of the regulatory state is 
not to control the regulated by imposing externally generated rules on 
them but to “harness[…] private capacity to serve public goals.”28 
This Article seeks to build upon this general approach as it examines 
the concept of self-regulation and its potential role in the post-crisis fi-
nancial regulation reform. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 24. Black, supra note 21, at 108. 
 25. Lobel, supra note 18, at 359–60. 
 26. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 18, at 468 (“There is a tendency to equate shifts from 
top-down regulation with deregulation, privatization, and devolution. The new gover-
nance paradigm resists this dichotomized world and requires ongoing roles for govern-
ment and law.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 548 (2000) (proposing an “alternative conception of administration as a set of 
negotiated relationships” whereby “public and private actors negotiate over policy mak-
ing, implementation, and enforcement.”). 
 28. Id. at 549. 
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B. Self-Regulation in Academic Debate: A Multi-Faceted Concept 
To the extent self-regulation denotes devolution of regulatory authority 
to private industry actors, it can be viewed as a particular form, or an 
element, of a broader model of New Governance. However, because the 
concept of self-regulation is both deceptively simple and heavily norma-
tively loaded, it is worth examining its meaning and boundaries in some 
detail. 
Policy-makers and academics debating the pros and cons of self-
regulation frequently equate that concept with “deregulation” and direct-
ly juxtapose it to the concept of government regulation of private eco-
nomic activities. Both the staunchest proponents and the most adamant 
opponents of self-regulation often share this fundamental view of self-
regulation and regulation as mutually exclusive alternatives.29 
Supporters of the idea of self-regulation by market actors claim that it 
offers significant advantages over direct government regulation. They 
tend to stress that self-regulation is considerably more flexible and con-
text-driven. Because private entities actively participating in the regu-
lated market activities are able to respond faster and better to the changes 
in market conditions, self-regulation is said to be inherently more effi-
cient, less costly, and less complicated than government regulation. From 
this perspective, self-regulation exemplifies a regulatory approach that is 
“responsive, flexible, informed, targeted, which prompts greater com-
pliance, and which at once stimulates and draws on the internal morality 
of the sector or organization being regulated.”30 Importantly, the advo-
cates of self-regulation emphasize its potential for fostering shared val-
ues among private actors, cultivating their sense of ownership and partic-
ipation in the rule-making process reflecting those values, and facilitating 
voluntary compliance with the resulting rules. 
The skeptics, on the other hand, view self-regulation as fundamentally 
“self-serving, self-interested, lacking in sanctions, beset with free rider 
problems, and simply a sham.”31 The critics argue that private profit-
seeking enterprises cannot be trusted to regulate their own activities in a 
manner conducive to promotion of publicly desirable goals. From this 
perspective, private industry self-regulation is unlikely to amount to any-
thing more than a mere smokescreen intended to create an illusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 29. The ideological content and rhetoric of self-regulation can also influence the prac-
tical policy decisions with respect to regulatory design. See, e.g., JULIA BLACK, RULES 
AND REGULATORS 1, 46–80 (1997) (discussing the role of political rhetoric in the actual 
design of the self-regulatory system set up in the U.K. under the Financial Services Act 
1986). 
 30. Black, supra note 21, at 115. 
 31. Id. 
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regulation. In addition to the deeply seated conflict of interest, the oppo-
nents of self-regulation point to its inherent inefficiencies, including 
widespread collective action problems, lack of effective enforcement 
capabilities, inability of self-regulatory organizations to gain or maintain 
legitimacy, and, ultimately, the failure of accountability.32 
Despite the powerful rhetoric both for and against self-regulation, the 
concept itself lacks definitional clarity. In practice, there are many differ-
ent forms of self-regulatory arrangements and institutions, depending on 
the specific context in which they evolve.33 Partially as a reflection of 
this reality, participants in theoretical and policy debates often employ 
different definitions of self-regulation, both in a positive and a normative 
sense. Thus, self-regulation is often used interchangeably with terms, 
such as “self-governance,” “collaborative governance,” “negotiated go-
vernance,” “co-regulation,” “voluntarism,” “private regulation,” “soft 
law,” “quasi-regulation,” “enforced self-regulation,” “communitarian 
regulation,” and so on. Each of these terms places the emphasis on a par-
ticular characteristic that arguably distinguishes true “self-regulation” 
from direct government regulation: the purely voluntary nature of regula-
tion, the concentration of rule-making authority solely in the hands of 
non-governmental actors, or the non-binding or non-legal nature of the 
rules themselves.34 
Many of these concepts attempt to overcome the one-sidedness of the 
traditional dichotomy between regulation and self-regulation and intro-
duce various hybrid solutions combining self-regulatory mechanisms 
with some degree of government involvement or oversight. These more 
sophisticated accounts view “command and control” and self-regulation 
as extreme points on a single regulatory continuum, with the majority of 
real-life regulatory regimes falling somewhere between them.35 For ex-
ample, an increasingly popular notion of “co-regulation” envisions a sys-
tem in which the public agencies and private market actors cooperate in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 32. According to one such critic, “Self-regulation is frequently an attempt to deceive 
the public into believing in the responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry. Sometimes it 
is a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing its job.” John Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation in Australia, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE 
91 (Peter Grabosky & John Braithwaite eds., 1993). 
 33. For example, various self-regulatory or public-private regulatory arrangements 
exist in such diverse fields and sectors of the economy as nuclear power industry, chemi-
cal manufacturing, healthcare, food safety, occupational safety, labor regulation, envi-
ronmental compliance, and corporate governance. 
 34. Black, supra note 21, at 116–117. 
 35. See Robyn Fairman & Charlotte Yapp, Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, 
and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement, 27 
LAW & POL’Y 491, 492 (2005). 
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the creation, implementation, and enforcement of rules.36 According to 
the proponents of the co-regulation model, Co-regulation is an approach 
in which a mixture of instruments is brought to bear on a specific prob-
lem […] typically involving both primary legislation and self-regulation 
or, if not self-regulation, at least some form of direct participation of bo-
dies representing stakeholders in the regulatory decision-making process. 
Co-regulation aims to combine the advantages of the predictability and 
binding nature of legislation with the flexibility of self-regulatory ap-
proaches.37 
Another popular approach, “enforced self-regulation,”38 advocates a 
system under which private businesses are required to assess, monitor, 
and regulate the risks they create, while the government enforces such 
privately made rules alongside with its enforcement of the direct admin-
istrative rules and regulations.39 In this regime, the government places 
the key responsibility for risk management directly on individual private 
entities, which results in a fundamental shift in the focus of the govern-
ment’s enforcement activity from discovering instances of non-
compliance with specific rules toward assessing the firms’ internal com-
pliance and risk management systems. Importantly, however, enforced 
self-regulation generally “differs from true self-regulation in that the 
standards to be achieved are determined by the regulator and not from 
within the industry.”40 
Even when scholars seem to agree on the definitional boundaries of 
self-regulation setting it apart from other forms of regulatory arrange-
ments, such as co-regulation or enforced self-regulation, they often part 
company when it comes to drawing more subtle internal distinctions 
among different kinds of self-regulation. Once again, multiple typologies 
of self-regulation developed in the academic literature reflect the wide 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 36. See, e.g., Marian Garcia Martinez, et al., Co-regulation as a Possible Model for 
Food Safety Governance: Opportunities for Public-private Partnerships, 32 FOOD POL’Y 
299 (2007); Edward Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United 
States: An Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENTS AND 
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 443 (Edward Balleisen & David 
Moss eds., 2009). 
 37. Martinez et al., supra note 36, at 302. 
 38. The term “enforced self-regulation” was coined by John Braithwaite. See John 
Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 
U. MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982). Braithwaite’s concept of “enforced self-regulation” is an 
integral part of the famous pyramidal regime of so-called “responsive regulation.” See 
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
 39. See Fairman and Yapp, supra note 35, at 493. 
 40. Id. 
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variety of real-life self-regulatory arrangements and their highly context-
sensitive nature. Generally, however, social scientists and legal academ-
ics tend to distinguish between systems of “voluntary” self-regulation, 
characterized by the absence of direct government intervention; “sanc-
tioned” self-regulation, in which private actors formulate rules subject to 
government approval; and “mandated” self-regulation, in which private 
actors are required by the government to establish a self-regulatory 
framework.41 
Another important nuance in the debate on self-regulation involves the 
choice of the main unit of analysis. Some authors examine self-
regulatory arrangements and techniques on an individual entity level,42 as 
is often the case in the field of corporate governance or compliance with 
environmental regulations, while others focus on self-regulation at a va-
riety of broader levels of collectivity—an industry, a region, or an ad-
ministrative unit.43 
While resolving these definitional issues is beyond the scope of this 
Article, even the most cursory overview of the ongoing debate on the 
meaning and variety of self-regulation is helpful in framing the inquiry 
into the basic nature of a potentially desirable self-regulatory regime in 
the financial services sector. However, the threshold question in this re-
spect is why, as a general matter, self-regulation may potentially be a 
valuable mechanism of financial sector regulation. 
II. AFTER THE CRISIS: A NEW RATIONALE FOR SELF-REGULATION IN 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR? 
This Part focuses on the concept of self-regulation in the financial ser-
vices sector and argues that redefining that concept should be a key ele-
ment of our post-crisis quest for an optimal regulatory framework geared 
toward preventing future financial meltdowns. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 41. See, e.g., Black, supra note 21, at 118–19; Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, 
Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 364–66 
(1997). Some of the more granular typologies also refer to “accredited” self-regulation, in 
which privately established rules are accredited by another private body (such as, e.g., a 
technical committee); “verified” self-regulation, in which third parties (auditors, NGOs, 
labor unions, etc.) monitor compliance with the rules; “partial” self-regulation, in which 
private sector engages only in rule-making; or “full” self-regulation, in which both rule-
making and enforcement are privatized. Id. 
 42. Some scholars refer to intra-firm self-regulatory activity as “management regula-
tion.” See Cory Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). 
 43. See Black, supra note 21, at 120–21; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 41, at 364. 
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A. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Reform: A Brief Outline of the De-
bate 
The recent global financial crisis brought the issues of long-term regu-
latory reform into the center of public debate in the U.S., as well as in 
other countries. Not surprisingly, in the past two years, academics and 
policy-makers advanced numerous proposals for reforming financial sec-
tor regulation. These proposals, ranging from abstract ideas to drafts of 
actual laws and regulations, address in a variety of ways the fundamental 
issue of translating the lessons of that last crisis into regulatory mechan-
isms designed to minimize the chances of similar crises in the future.44 
Responding to the mounting political pressure, lawmakers and govern-
ment agencies around the world are presently working on legislative and 
regulatory reform packages, which reflect many of the ideas advanced in 
these proposals.45 One of the key milestones in this process was the re-
cent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act introducing major changes to the 
U.S. financial sector regulation.46 
However, even the successful adoption of wide-ranging financial 
reform legislation in the U.S., despite its undeniable importance, is un-
likely to provide perfect solutions to main regulatory dilemmas and end 
the broader debate on the future of financial sector regulation and super-
vision.47 Leaving aside the gaps and ambiguities in the new law, it is im-
portant to remember that financial regulation reform in the era of rapid 
technology-driven innovation is an inherently dynamic phenomenon. 
Conceptually, it should be viewed as an ongoing intellectual enterprise, a 
process of continuous collective deliberation and exchange of ideas, ra-
ther than a static set of rules enacted into law at any particular point. Ef-
fective prevention of financial crises and containment of systemic risk in 
the increasingly complex global financial markets will continue to be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 44. See supra notes 2–3. 
 45. Thus, the European Union is currently in the process of restructuring its system of 
overseeing financial institutions and setting up new European regulators with enhanced 
institutional capabilities and powers. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2009), 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communicatio
n_may2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf. 
 46. See supra note 2. 
 47. One of the key criticisms of the Dodd-Frank Act is its deliberate vagueness and 
failure to resolve many fundamentally important policy issues, leaving them instead to 
the discretion of implementing agencies. Thus, according to some estimates, the statute 
mandates that regulators enact 243 new rules, conduct 67 one-time studies and submit 22 
periodic reports. This approach creates a great deal of uncertainty as to the ultimate effect 
of the reform. See Kaper, supra note 4. 
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moving target for regulators and policy-makers. The insights and ap-
proaches developed in today’s discussions will continue to shape the 
search for more effective long-term policy solutions that go beyond the 
current legal and regulatory changes. From this perspective, mapping out 
the principal trends in the current debate on the form and substance of 
the financial sector regulation and identifying some of the key themes 
running through most of the recent proposals is an important step toward 
understanding potential gaps in this ongoing process.48 
The first unifying characteristic of the current debate on financial regu-
lation reform is the strong focus on the structure, functions, and jurisdic-
tional boundaries of regulatory agencies overseeing the financial services 
sector. Despite the vastly different substantive approaches to these is-
sues, nearly all major proposals for redesigning financial regulation con-
centrate heavily on such issues as the role and organizational form of a 
regulatory agency directly charged with monitoring and prevention of 
systemic financial risk,49 the proper role of central banks vis-à-vis pru-
dential regulatory and supervisory bodies,50 and creation of institutional 
mechanisms for stronger protection of retail investors and consumers of 
financial services.51 An important part of the discussion concerns the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 48. For an analysis of some of the key trends in the reform debate, see also Cunning-
ham & Zaring, supra note 5; Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 5. 
 49. While nearly all reform proposals seem to accept the need for a regulatory body 
charged with systemic risk oversight, there is some disagreement as to the form of such a 
regulator. In the U.S., the main debate centered around proposals to assign this function 
to the Federal Reserve, to a newly established separate federal agency, or a council com-
prising representatives of financial regulators. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Contro-
versy Over Systemic Risk Regulation, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 823 (2010) (discussing in 
detail different approaches to the issue of systemic risk regulation). The Dodd-Frank Act 
mandates the establishment of the interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
which will work closely with the Federal Reserve to monitor and minimize systemic risk. 
 50. The debate about whether or not central banks should perform regulatory and 
supervisory functions, in addition to their traditional monetary policy duties, is hardly a 
new one. In the post-crisis era, this issue was replayed not only in the context of the de-
bate over the Federal Reserve’s role in overseeing financial institutions, but also with 
respect to potential reallocation of regulatory and supervisory powers between the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) and the Bank of England. See, e.g., 
Brooke Masters & George Parker, Osborne Promises Caution Over FSA Reform, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/ae5477a4-9d6d-11de-9f4a-
00144feabdc02.html2.nclick_check=1. On June 16, 2010, Chancellor Osborne announced 
his decision to abolish the FSA and transfer its bank regulatory and supervisory powers to 
the Bank of England. See, e.g., George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne Abolishes 
FSA and Boosts Bank, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0203b99e-797f-11df-b063-00144feabdc0.html. 
 51. Thus, creation of the new federal regulatory authority specifically dealing with 
consumer protection in the financial services sector has been at the center of an intense 
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formation of a new resolution authority that would be in charge of order-
ly unwinding of financial conglomerates falling outside the jurisdictional 
reach of any of the existing resolution authorities in the financial sector.52 
In the U.S., the debate on specific regulatory structure also involves is-
sues of consolidating multiple regulators in banking, securities, and 
commodities futures sectors,53 introducing federal regulation of insurance 
industry,54 and redefining the general balance of state and federal regula-
tory powers with respect to the provision of financial services.55 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
debate among policy-makers, academics, and industry lobbyists in the U.S. See, e.g., 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 34–37 (discussing potential alterna-
tives for creation of a new consumer financial protection regulator); U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 2, at 55–70 (proposing the creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency). The Dodd-Frank Act mandates the creation of 
an independent Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection within the Federal Reserve, a 
result of political compromise reached in Congress after a prolonged battle over this is-
sue. 
 52. The failure of Lehman Brothers, a major U.S. investment bank with worldwide 
assets and liabilities, has forcefully underscored the importance of regulatory coordina-
tion, and ideally preventive intervention, not only across geographic borders but also 
across sectoral and entity lines. In the wake of the crisis, many reform proposals focused 
on the need to allocate the authority to resolve large financial conglomerates to a single 
regulatory agency, such as the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (“FDIC”), or a newly established separate resolution authority. The Dodd-Frank Act 
generally grants the FDIC new resolution authority over a broad range of financial insti-
tutions. 
 53. The U.S. federal system of regulation and supervision of the financial services 
sector is highly fragmented, with the regulatory authority split among five different agen-
cies overseeing depository institutions (the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit 
Union Administration), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Over the years, numerous proposals 
called for reducing the number of financial regulators by merging some or all of them. 
See, e.g., U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY 
TRENDS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE GAO-08-32 
(Oct. 2007). In the current debate, various proposals approached this issue in differing 
ways. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 2, at 32 
(proposing the creation of a single National Bank Supervisor overseeing all federally-
chartered banks). By contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act calls only for the elimination of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”). 
 54. One of the peculiar features of the U.S. system of financial regulation is that in-
surance industry is regulated and supervised by individual states. Numerous reform pro-
posals over the years advocated the creation of a federal insurance charter and establish-
ing a federal insurance regulator. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A 
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE, supra note 2, at 128–29 (proposing 
an optional federal insurance charter and the creation of the Office of National Insur-
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Another important general theme running through the current debate 
on regulatory reform is regulatory oversight of presently unregulated, or 
under-regulated, financial markets and institutions. It is now common 
wisdom that one of the main causes of the recent crisis was the uncon-
trolled accumulation of financial risk in the so-called “shadow banking 
system” that operated entirely outside any governmental supervision.56 
To remedy this situation, many proposals call for introduction of some 
form of direct government regulation and supervision of OTC derivatives 
markets, as well as hedge funds and other private investment vehicles.57 
Similarly, many proposals seek to subject mortgage brokers and credit 
ratings agencies to greater oversight.58 
The third line of proposed reforms aims at strengthening certain exist-
ing rules and regulations and enhancing the quality of enforcement and 
compliance. One of the most prominent issues in this area involves revi-
sion of the current capital adequacy regime for banks and other financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
ance). The Dodd-Frank Act leaves the existing structure of insurance regulation largely 
intact. 
 55. Thus, one of the critical issues in the ongoing debate on bank regulation is the 
extent of federal preemption, especially with respect to states’ power to enforce their 
consumer protection laws in connection with national banks’ operations. See, e.g., Wat-
ters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (holding that state authorities are precluded 
from enforcing states’ licensing, registration, and inspection laws against state-chartered 
subsidiaries of national banks); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2710 
(2009) (upholding states’ authority to seek judicial enforcement of applicable state laws 
against national banks). 
 56. For one of the early attempts to argue that the unchecked growth of the “shadow 
banking system” was at the core of the growing problems in the financial services sector, 
see Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York, Reducing Sys-
temic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System, (June 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/tfg080609.html (referring to the 
expansion of a “parallel financial system” vulnerable to runs and other increased risks). 
 57. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 2, at 
46–49. In the second half of 2009, proposals seeking to move the majority of OTC deriv-
atives trading onto organized exchanges and to mandate centralized clearing for such 
instruments garnered a significant momentum and generated general support among poli-
cy-makers and financial institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly incorporated these 
proposals. 
 58. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 2, at 46; 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7. See also Frank Partnoy, Rethink-
ing Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective (Univ. of 
San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608; Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles”… 
And Letting the Bad Loans Win—When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for 
Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737 (2008). 
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institutions as a way to limit their leverage, enhance liquidity, and better 
align their capital with their actual risk profiles.59 Another important top-
ic that falls under the same broad rubric is the proposed creation of an 
enhanced regulatory and supervisory oversight of financial institutions 
deemed to be of systemic importance—so-called “systemically important 
financial institutions,” or SIFIs.60 
Finally, a significant recurring theme in the reform debate relates to the 
perceived need to strengthen global regulatory and supervisory coopera-
tion and coordination of efforts to monitor cross-border markets and ac-
tivities for potential accumulation of systemic risk and to adopt measures 
to deal with such risk effectively and on a timely basis.61 Although the 
critical importance of international aspects of regulatory reform is widely 
acknowledged, there is little clarity or consensus on the specific meas-
ures that would be both effective and politically feasible in resolving the 
deep underlying problems of sovereignty and national differences in reg-
ulatory approaches.62 
Many of the recently advanced regulatory reform proposals combine, 
in various ways, these key themes and offer highly valuable analytical 
insights and potential solutions to perceived problems. Nevertheless, the 
overall discussion of financial regulation reform seems excessively 
preoccupied with the issues of regulatory structure and architecture. With 
respect to substantive changes in legal and regulatory frameworks, the 
prevailing tendency is to focus debate on specific market products or ac-
tors directly implicated in the recent financial crisis. In pursuit of con-
crete, politically viable solutions to identifiable problems, the majority of 
approaches to regulatory reform tend to lose sight of the fundamental 
problems that such reforms ultimately seek to address. Characteristically, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 59. See, e.g., U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION: 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM, GAO-09-739 (July 2009). 
 60. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 2, at 
51–54; CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7; Brunnermeier, et al., su-
pra note 2, at 24. The Dodd-Frank Act vests the power to identify systemically important 
financial institutions in the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council but 
leaves it largely to the Federal Reserve to determine how such institutions are to be regu-
lated and supervised. 
 61. See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 2; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE 
TURNER REVIEW, supra note 3. 
 62. For a general overview of some of the key issues in this area, see, e.g., Douglas 
W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability 
Board: Hardening the Soft Law of the International Financial Regulation?, 32 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 488 (2009). 
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none of the mainstream reform proposals has addressed explicitly the 
future of industry self-regulation as part of the long-term regulatory 
transformation in the financial services sector. 
B. Potential Benefits of (Reinventing) Financial Sector Self-Regulation 
As the recent financial crisis demonstrated, the most fundamental prob-
lems that a truly effective regulatory reform must address are the increas-
ing complexity of financial markets and activities and their global 
reach.63 The unprecedented speed with which the tremors in the U.S. 
subprime mortgage market spread worldwide exposed the fundamental 
vulnerabilities of the global financial system, including the ways in 
which numerous institutions and investors are intimately interconnected 
through a web of complex financial transactions and risk exposure.64 The 
widespread use of complex financial instruments also greatly contributed 
to the dangerously high levels of leverage accumulated throughout the 
system.65 Thus, in the post-crisis world of finance, the ability of regulato-
ry authorities to detect and prevent, or at least minimize, systemic risk 
depends ultimately on their ability to manage the complexity and global 
nature of financial products, institutions, and activities.66 
This view of the financial crisis leads to two general conclusions. The 
first conclusion relates to the centrality of information flow to regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 63. See Saule Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on 
the “Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 157 (2009). 
 64. The general issue of regulating complex systems is a fascinating and growing 
academic field. For some examples of these scholarly analyses, see, e.g., Donald T. 
Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913 
(2005); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 211 (2010). 
 65. Thus, one of the key examples in this respect is the central role that trading in 
credit derivatives played in the near-failure and the resulting bailout of American Interna-
tional Group (“AIG”). See, e.g., Hugh Son & Zachary R. Mider, AIG Rescue May Include 
Credit-Default Swap Backstop, BLOOMBERG.COM, FEB 26, 2009. For a scholarly analysis 
of the AIG saga, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
943 (2009). 
 66. The role of derivatives in creating or exacerbating the recent financial crisis is a 
complicated and hotly debated issue. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, How De-Regulating Deriva-
tives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-regulating Them Can Prevent Another, LOMBARD 
STREET, Vol. 1, No. 7, at 4 (July 6, 2009), available at 
www.finreg21.com/system/files/Lombard+Street+-+Volume+1+Issue+7.pdf; Rene M. 
Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. 
Working Paper No. 264/2009, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475323 (arguing that credit default 
swaps did not cause the credit crisis of 2007-2008). 
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success. It is clear that the key to managing an increasingly complex fi-
nancial system is timely access to, and ability to process, relevant market 
information. In a world driven by the never-ending quest for faster and 
more sophisticated technology, it is critically important that financial 
regulators maintain their capacity to monitor, identify, evaluate, and 
promptly respond to the risks and challenges presented by the increasing-
ly complex financial instruments and trading strategies.67 The second 
observation concerns the effect of financial globalization on regulatory 
capacity. In today’s increasingly interconnected and globalized financial 
markets, national governments face serious challenges in their efforts to 
regulate and supervise internationally active financial institutions. Moni-
toring cross-border financial activities and enforcing compliance with 
any single country’s laws and regulations is a particularly delicate and 
complex political task because it raises numerous issues of state sove-
reignty and extraterritoriality. In the world of sovereign nation-states, 
national regulators’ limited jurisdiction over financial matters is increa-
singly inconsistent with the seamlessly integrated cross-border opera-
tions of modern financial institutions. Despite the ongoing efforts to im-
plement various forms of international coordination and market over-
sight,68 this inherent limitation on regulatory capacity continues to com-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 67. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informa-
tional Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 
(1993); Schwarcz, supra note 64. 
 68. One of the best-known and studied examples of such efforts to institutionalize 
international regulatory coordination and harmonization is the international capital ade-
quacy accord promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), 
an organization comprising heads of central banks and bank supervisors from different 
countries. For more information on the BCBS and Basel capital adequacy regime, see 
About the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). Another 
example of international cooperation in the area of monitoring and enforcing compliance 
by individual countries with various internationally adopted standards is the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (“FSAP”) established by the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) and the World Bank. For an analysis of the activities of, and challenges faced 
by, FSAP since its inception in the late 1990s, see THE FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
AFTER TEN YEARS: EXPERIENCE AND REFORM FOR THE NEXT DECADE (International Mon-
etary Fund and The World Bank, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf. However, despite their suc-
cesses in addressing a variety of specific regulatory issues arising in the global financial 
marketplace, there remain important limitations on these institutions’ ability to provide 
lasting and universal solutions to the underlying problems of effective regulation and 
supervision of global and increasingly complex financial markets and institutions. These 
institutions generally operate through non-mandatory, legally non-binding arrangements 
dubbed as “soft law.” See generally, ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administra-
tion, 5 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 547 (2005). Developing these regulatory norms and monitoring 
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plicate the detection and prevention of risk to the entire global financial 
system and broader economy.69 
These two general observations make it clear that, in order to be able to 
avoid systemic crises in the future, any reform of the financial sector 
regulation must address two fundamental issues: (1) assuring timely 
access to, and analysis of, key market information; and (2) regulating and 
monitoring financial activities and risks on a truly global, cross-border 
basis. This Article argues that industry self-regulation, as a form of regu-
latory intervention into the economy distinct from both direct govern-
ment regulation and pure market discipline, holds significant promise in 
terms of addressing these challenges. 
It is important to emphasize from the outset that industry self-
regulation cannot, and should not fully replace government regulation 
and supervision of the financial services sector. Government oversight is 
crucial to ensuring that private financial activity promotes, or at least is 
consistent with, the broader public interest.70 Learning the difficult les-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
their implementation is of necessity a heavily negotiated, highly politicized and complex 
process, and the reach of these institutions is limited. For a recent scholarly discussion of 
the dilemmas and limitations of international financial regulation, see Eric J. Pan, Chal-
lenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: 
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2010). 
 69. Thus, in response to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, the governments of 
the Group of Twenty (G-20) began focusing on greater coordination of their regulatory 
and supervisory activities and called for a number of measures aimed at creating an insti-
tutional structure for overseeing financial markets across borders. GROUP OF TWENTY (G-
20), DECLARATION SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, Nov. 15, 
2008, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. One 
related proposal envisions an establishment of so-called cross-border supervisory “col-
leges” in charge of supervising individual financial conglomerates with operations in 
multiple countries. The G-20 leaders called for redefining the role of the International 
Monetary Fund as a de facto global “lender of last resort” monitoring financial stability 
on international level. Larry Wall, et al., Creating an EU Level Supervisor for Cross-
Border Banking Groups: Issues Raised by the U.S. Experience with Dual Banking (un-
published manuscript, presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference, EU Eco-
nomic Integration: Lessons of the Past, and What Does the Future Hold?, Mar. 18, 2010), 
available at www.dallasfed.org/institute/events/2010/10eu_mayes.pdf. The G-20 has also 
reinvented the existing Financial Stability Forum as the Financial Stability Board 
(“FSB”), a newly bolstered international regulatory body in charge of monitoring global 
systemic risk. See About the Financial Stability Board, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (last visited Aug. 6, 2010). However, as the FSB’s 
institutional structure and mode of operation are still largely in flux, it remains to be seen 
how well the FSB will be able to implement this mandate in practice. Similarly, at this 
stage in the process, it is difficult to predict whether, and to what extent, the IMF will be 
successful in its newly envisioned role as the global liquidity provider. 
 70. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
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sons of the latest financial crisis, national governments and domestic and 
international regulatory bodies are actively working toward refining and 
improving financial regulators’ and supervisors’ capacity to access and 
manage market information, both domestically and across borders. Many 
of the currently contemplated regulatory reforms aim precisely at the 
principal weaknesses identified in these areas. 
However, despite the fact that these reform efforts, without a doubt, are 
both important and necessary, government agencies may be ultimately 
facing an uphill battle in this respect. There are compelling reasons to 
believe that, in today’s world, government regulators may be increasing-
ly less effective in managing the complexity and internationalization of 
financial markets, particularly if they continue relying on the traditional 
regulatory methods and techniques. Involving private institutions in the 
process of actively regulating complex, information-intensive financial 
activities and markets may serve as an effective and efficient supplement 
to governments’ efforts, thus offering an important potential solution to 
this fundamental regulatory problem. 
With respect to access to market information, private actors have a sig-
nificant potential advantage over government regulators in terms of their 
relative ability to identify, analyze, and evaluate potential systemic im-
plications of the underlying trends in the global financial markets, partic-
ularly with respect to complex financial products and transactions. As a 
general matter, private investors and financial institutions are better 
equipped to access the key market data in real time and to process that 
information intelligently and efficiently. Their “insider” position enables 
private market participants to make potentially better-informed judg-
ments as to what financial information is relevant to issues of systemic 
risk prevention, and how any particular piece of such information affects 
the broader picture. The industry actors’ relatively greater potential abili-
ty to understand and analyze increasingly complex and overwhelmingly 
voluminous financial information represents a crucial advantage from the 
perspective of regulatory efficiency and efficacy. 
It is important to keep in mind that this informational advantage is a 
relative phenomenon. It is meant to emphasize only that financial institu-
tions, by virtue of their very position as key participants in financial 
markets and actual creators and users of complex financial instruments, 
are inherently in a better position to understand and analyze the bottom-
up patterns of systemic financial risk than government regulators. Ac-
knowledging the industry’s relative informational advantage is not the 
same as claiming that financial institutions, in fact, always possess the 
perfect knowledge and understanding of system-wide trends and vulne-
rabilities and, therefore, should replace government as the sole source of 
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regulatory decision-making. As the recent crisis so aptly demonstrated, 
even the highest-level executives at the most sophisticated financial 
firms around the world have not always been able to detect and measure 
the true extent of risk their companies carried on, or off, their balance 
sheets.71 
Nevertheless, even allowing for all these complexities in the modern-
day fragmentation of knowledge,72 it is fair to say that government agen-
cies in charge of the financial services sector suffer from serious built-in 
informational disadvantages vis-à-vis financial institutions. Under the 
existing legal and regulatory framework, U.S. financial regulators, as a 
general matter, do not require reporting of all trading data or other mar-
ket information by financial institutions. The bulk of the most complex 
financial transactions take place in the over-the-counter, or OTC, mar-
kets, where individual counterparties enter in bilateral contracts that do 
not have to be publicly disclosed or reported to the regulators. To the 
extent the regulatory and supervisory authorities get access to this type of 
market information, it usually happens after the fact, at times significant-
ly so, and on an aggregated basis, either with respect to a specific firm or 
an entire market segment.73 While this information is very important for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 71. See, e.g., Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy 
Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of 
Richard S. Fuld, Jr.), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/fuld_4.20.10.pdf [hereinafter, 
Fuld Testimony]. In this statement, the former CEO of Lehman Brothers claimed that he 
had absolutely no recollection of ever hearing anything about the so-called “Repo 105” 
transactions used to hide the true extent of Lehman’s debt. 
 72. Thus, Julia Black describes this phenomenon as “fragmentation, and construction, 
of knowledge” in today’s complex society: 
In the decentered understanding of regulation, however, the information prob-
lem is more complex. For unlike the traditional analysis, it does not assume that 
any one actor has all the information necessary to solve social problems: it is 
not a question of industry having, government needing. Rather, no single actor 
has all the knowledge required to solve complex, diverse, and dynamic prob-
lems, and no single actor has the overview necessary to employ all the instru-
ments needed to make regulation effective. 
Black, supra note 21, at 107. 
 73. For example, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the primary 
regulator of the U.S. federally chartered banks, collects information on U.S. banks’ OTC 
derivatives transactions mainly through the analysis of the mandatory quarterly financial 
reports and the process of on-site examination of individual banking institutions. The 
OCC then aggregates the information on an industry-wide basis and publishes, on a quar-
terly basis, a report on the total size and trends in the OTC derivatives activities of U.S. 
commercial banks. See, e.g., OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading & Derivatives 
688 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
the purposes of gauging the overall size of, and trends in, the relevant 
markets, it is of a limited usefulness in terms of enabling the regulators to 
keep up with the developments in some of the most complex, and rapidly 
expanding, financial markets. 
Of course, it is possible to change the law to mandate real-time report-
ing of all, or most, market information that currently goes unreported to 
financial regulators.74 However, such a measure would hardly resolve the 
underlying issue of regulatory capacity to make efficient use of such in-
formation. For example, if all trade data in the OTC financial markets is 
collected and reported directly to the government agencies, the sheer 
amount of such data may prove to be overwhelming, especially given the 
perennial staffing and budgetary constraints at the agencies. Moreover, 
increasingly sophisticated trading strategies involving complex coordi-
nated plays across many different asset classes may not be readily visible 
to the regulator’s eye, even if the individual elements of a particular 
strategy are disclosed to such regulator as part of the mandatory report-
ing process. As a result, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible 
in most cases, for the regulatory authorities to discern potentially troub-
lesome signs of systemic vulnerabilities emerging in the markets for 
complex financial products in time to be able to respond to them.75 Al-
though U.S. financial regulators accumulated significant experience with 
monitoring securities and futures markets for potentially abusive or frau-
dulent activities, detecting potential systemic risk accumulation requires 
a much more nuanced and intimate understanding of how all pieces of 
this highly complicated puzzle fit together. Even the best and most effi-
cient government agencies are unlikely to possess sufficient expertise—
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Activities, Fourth Quarter 2009 1, 1 (Comptroller of the Currency Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, 
Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2010-33a.pdf. 
 74. In fact, several legislative proposals to require reporting of all OTC derivatives 
trades to regulatory agencies have been put forward in 2009. The Dodd-Frank Act, 
among other things, requires the SEC and CFTC to promulgate rules for public reporting 
of certain swap transaction and pricing data. 
 75. It is worth noting that the supervisory practice of placing resident examiners at 
the largest and most complex financial institutions, as it exists in the U.S. banking sector, 
is not necessarily effective in assessing systemic financial risks and vulnerabilities. Even 
if resident examiners may develop a thorough understanding of a particular firm’s busi-
ness operations and risk profile, they are hardly in a position to assess broader risks to the 
financial system because the focus of their examination remains on an individual enter-
prise. Thus, despite the fact that, beginning in March 2008, examiners from the SEC and 
the Federal Reserve were stationed at Lehman Brothers and monitored the firm’s activi-
ties on a daily basis, they failed to foresee or avert the firm’s ultimate failure. See Fuld 
Testimony, supra note 71, at 2. 
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as well as financial and organizational resources—to meet that chal-
lenge.76 
An obvious practical difficulty in this respect is that, in order to en-
hance their professional expertise, government agencies have to hire the 
best available specialists in the relevant areas and offer these experts 
compensation high enough to lure them away from potentially lucrative 
employment at investment banks and hedge funds. Competing with the 
private sector on these terms is hardly a viable proposition for govern-
ment agencies. However, an even more fundamental issue with this ap-
proach to resolving the problem of informational asymmetry relates to 
the dynamic nature of the required expertise. In reality, the level of one’s 
education or natural brilliance does not necessarily translate into the ac-
tual knowledge of the industry and market trends. In the fast-moving 
world of complex finance, the best, if not the only, way to develop and 
maintain such knowledge is to stay in the trenches, structuring and ex-
ecuting actual business transactions. Government employees, no matter 
how well trained or highly credentialed, cannot be expected to possess 
such intimate, and highly dynamic, transactional knowledge. 
This expertise deficit, coupled with the resource limitations, is a signif-
icant disadvantage of a system relying exclusively on direct government 
oversight of systemic risk in an increasingly complex financial universe. 
In such a system, the regulators will always run the risk of staying at 
least a step behind the industry, not only in a temporal sense but also in 
terms of understanding substantive implications of market practices and 
trends for systemic risk prevention. At the same time, private industry 
actors, free of regulatory responsibility and armed with superior market 
knowledge and financial and technological resources, will keep finding 
new methods of circumventing government-imposed rules and regula-
tions. The government agencies’ attempts to gather more information and 
impose more onerous rules are likely to create further incentives for the 
industry to evade regulatory limits.77 This self-perpetuating dynamic, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 76. In fact, many commentators on financial regulation reform lament the fact of such 
informational lag and expertise deficit and call for strengthening the cadre of regulatory 
agencies by attracting the best and the brightest economists, lawyers, and other trained 
specialists to serve at government agencies. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern 
Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. 
PA. L. REV. 333, 412 (1989); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving 
the SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 331 (2007). 
 77. Regulatory arbitrage is the fundamental challenge facing regulators in an increa-
singly complex financial sector environment. See, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisn-
er, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private 
Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127, 143 (David 
Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); WOLFGANG SCHULZ & THORSTEN HELD, REGULATED 
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putting the regulators and the private actors on opposite sides of a regula-
tory arbitrage game, is likely to elevate the level of complexity in the 
global financial markets and further exacerbate potential systemic risk. 
In principle, the government can attempt to resolve this fundamental 
problem by pursuing a radical solution and imposing strict absolute lim-
its on the level of risk in the financial system. One example of such regu-
latory strategy would be an outright prohibition on certain types of com-
plex financial products, such as, credit default swaps.78 Extending the 
application of state anti-gambling statutes and so-called “bucket shop” 
prohibitions to certain derivative instruments would also outlaw such 
products.79 A less drastic alternative would be a requirement of prior 
regulatory approval for complex financial products. Although the manda-
tory approval system stops short of direct product prohibition, for many 
practical reasons, it is likely to have the same practical effect. While po-
tential benefits and disadvantages of pursuing these options are the sub-
ject of ongoing academic debates, as a practical matter, they may not be 
feasible, at least in the foreseeable future. Part of the reason is the politi-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
SELF-REGULATION AS A FORM OF MODERN GOVERNMENT B11–B12 (Interim Report for 
Study commissioned by the German Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Af-
fairs, Oct. 2001), available at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/media/documents/interim-
report-self-regulation.pdf; Sinclair, supra note 20, at 542. 
 78. A credit default swap (“CDS”) is a derivative instrument under which one party 
(seller) sells to another party (buyer) protection against default on a credit obligation of a 
third party (a reference entity). See, e.g., PAUL C. HARDING., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 
2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 6 (2004). In 2009, various proposals to 
outlaw so-called “naked” CDS transactions, in which the buyer of protection does not 
have an actual credit exposure to the reference entity and essentially uses the CDS as a 
means of speculation, were under consideration. For instance, in November 2009, the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators, an organization consisting of state legisla-
tors involved in oversight of their states’ insurance regulatory matters, voted to approve 
so-called Credit Default Insurance Model Legislation that prohibited “naked” CDS con-
tracts. See Press Release, Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators (NCOIL), NCOIL Approves CDI 
Legislation, Eliminates “Naked” Swaps (Nov. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2009/11232009CDIPressRelease.pdf. 
 79. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gam-
bling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 256 
(2001) (explaining the operation of state anti-gambling and anti-bucket shop statutes); 
Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 729 (1999); Thomas Lee Hazen, Dispa-
rate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regu-
lation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 395 (2005). For a 
more detailed discussion of the history of state anti-gambling statutes and “bucket shop” 
prohibitions, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investment, Speculation, or Gambling?—
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effects on the Underlying Capital 
Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987 (1992). 
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cal difficulty of passing legislation that would essentially shut down a 
significant part of the U.S. financial markets. This type of legislation 
would likely draw fierce opposition and heavy lobbying by the financial 
industry. Even more importantly, even if lawmakers did adopt such dras-
tic measures, it is unclear whether the regulators would be able to im-
plement and enforce them effectively, especially given the financial insti-
tutions’ cross-border mobility and arbitrage capacity.80 
With respect to globalization and cross-border fluidity of financial ac-
tivities, industry self-regulation also has significant potential advantages 
over direct government regulation. In today’s globalized world, cross-
border arbitrage significantly undermines national governments’ ability 
to implement and enforce laws and regulations they consider vital for the 
purposes of maintaining their domestic economic stability or meeting 
other socio-economic or political goals.81 Moreover, strict application 
and enforcement of domestic laws and regulations to internationally ac-
tive financial institutions frequently raises thorny issues of extraterrito-
riality and jurisdictional overreach.82 In order to be able to monitor and 
enforce compliance with domestic law, government regulatory agencies 
are becoming increasingly dependent on cooperation and assistance of 
their foreign counterparts, most notably with respect to information-
sharing and coordination of enforcement activities, and are searching for 
creative ways to ensure such cooperation.83 Despite the ongoing efforts 
to ensure international regulatory cooperation in the formulation of rules, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 80. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis in Greece, which threatened stability 
of the entire Eurozone, the EU authorities began considering limiting the use of certain 
credit derivatives that were viewed as contributing factors in that crisis. See David Oak-
ley, Moves in Motion to Limit CDS Use, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/608abed2-218b-11df-830e-00144feab49a.html. 
 81. See, e.g., Ethipois Tafara & Robert Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border 
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 31, 32 
(2007). 
 82. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327 
(2010). 
 83. For instance, in addition to using traditional inter-agency Memoranda of Under-
standing establishing a framework for bilateral regulatory cooperation in specific areas, 
the U.S. financial regulators are increasingly relying on more subtle and indirect methods 
of actively encouraging foreign governments to adopt regulatory and supervisory ap-
proaches similar to those underlying the U.S. system. Among others, one such method 
involves lifting or easing barriers to entry into the U.S. financial markets for foreign mar-
ket intermediaries. For an insightful analysis of the challenges national regulators face in 
their search for a greater and more effective international harmonization, see, for exam-
ple, Brummer, supra note 82. 
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as well as their implementation and enforcement, significant problems 
continue to plague such efforts.84 
By contrast, private economic actors—financial institutions and inves-
tors—are not constrained by jurisdictional considerations and are able to 
oversee and manage their business affairs across national borders much 
more seamlessly than any government agency. In fact, the U.S. laws and 
regulations essentially mandate that large, internationally active financial 
institutions manage their business risk on a consolidated basis.85 As a 
result, industry actors are potentially better situated to monitor and man-
age risk to the financial system on a truly global basis.86 
Importantly, this Article does not argue that the financial services in-
dustry can, or will, actually perform the regulatory functions better than 
the government. The argument here is merely that the financial industry 
has certain built-in potential advantages with respect to its ability to ad-
dress the key regulatory challenges posed by the increasing complexity 
and globalization of financial markets and activities. Leveraging this un-
iquely advantageous position of private market participants for the pur-
poses of addressing these challenges may offer an effective method of 
controlling systemic risks in global financial markets. Imposing respon-
sibility for regulating and minimizing systemic risk directly on financial 
institutions can serve as a powerful addition to the ongoing efforts to 
strengthen the government regulatory framework and market-based in-
centives for more prudent financial conduct. 
Whether or not, and to what extent, this regulatory potential is realized 
in practice depends ultimately on the institutional design and the broader 
incentive structure within which a self-regulatory regime exists. First and 
foremost, envisioning such a new regime requires a fundamental norma-
tive shift in our concept of self-regulation, especially in comparison to 
the existing SRO model in the U.S. securities industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 84. See, e.g., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS: REPORT TO THE G-20 
FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (prepared by the Int’l Monetary 
Fund Staff and the Fin. Stability Bd. Secretariat, Oct. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107e.pdf. 
 85. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b) (2009). 
 86. See, e. g., Balleisen, supra note 36, at 443 (“Whatever the limitations associated 
with private regulation, it sometimes offers the only practical means of constraining the 
behavior of multi-national corporations whose production facilities and distribution net-
works span the globe.”). 
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III. REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: FROM 
SROS TO “EMBEDDED SELF-REGULATION” 
Financial industry self-regulation is by no means a new concept. Vari-
ous self-regulatory arrangements operate, with different degrees of suc-
cess, in many countries and in multiple institutional settings. In the U.S., 
self-regulation is one of the defining characteristics of the existing regu-
latory scheme in the securities industry but is virtually absent in banking 
or insurance. This Part examines the existing self-regulatory regime in 
the U.S. securities industry and argues that a fundamental shift in the 
entire paradigm of financial sector self-regulation is necessary in order to 
overcome its current limitations from the perspective of monitoring and 
minimizing systemic risk. 
A. The SRO System: Existing Self-Regulation in the U.S. Securities In-
dustry 
Self-regulation of market intermediaries through a system of statutorily 
established SROs is one of the core elements of the U.S. securities regu-
lation framework. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,87 a variety 
of SROs, including national securities exchanges and the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), exercise extensive oversight 
over securities broker-dealers, stock exchange members and listed com-
panies, and other market intermediaries.88 Stock exchanges were the 
original self-regulatory organizations that governed the trading of securi-
ties and regulated their members well before the creation of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the current statutory framework 
formalizing their SRO status.89 The New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) is the largest and most important SRO among the registered 
national securities exchanges.90 However, it is FINRA, a national securi-
ties association formed in July 2007 by merging its predecessor, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), with the NYSE’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78a–78mm (2000)). 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f; 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. 
 89. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Self-Regulatory Organizations,  N.Y. 
LAW J., June 18, 2009, at 3; Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for Accommo-
dation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 481 (1984). 
 90. For general information on NYSE, see New York Stock Exchange Euronext, 
About Us, http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). 
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regulatory arm, that is the single largest SRO regulating securities bro-
ker-dealers.91 
Under the statutory scheme, SROs are primarily responsible for estab-
lishing the standards under which their members conduct business and 
monitoring the way their members conduct their business in practice. 
Securities SROs enforce compliance by their members with the U.S. se-
curities laws and regulations and discipline their members for violating 
such laws and regulations, as well as SROs’ own rules.92 The SRO regu-
latory oversight focuses heavily on monitoring and investigating suspi-
cious activities in securities trading, detecting and preventing securities 
fraud and other forms of investor abuse, and generally acting as one of 
the key gatekeepers in the securities markets.93 It is hardly an exaggera-
tion to say that the fundamental objective of self-regulation in the U.S. 
securities industry is “investor protection and market integrity through 
effective and efficient regulation.”94 
To fulfill their regulatory responsibilities, securities SROs maintain ex-
tensive rulebooks governing in detail the day-to-day conduct of business 
by their members. For example, FINRA Rules contain detailed provi-
sions mandating how broker-dealers communicate with customers and 
what types of information they provide to them. Numerous standards 
govern how securities professionals segregate and safeguard customers’ 
funds, collateralize extensions of credit to customers, and make recom-
mendations to their clients with respect to securities transactions. Fur-
thermore, a long list of FINRA rules deal with the members’ duty to su-
pervise the actions of their employees, maintain books and records, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 91. Under the statutory scheme, all U.S. securities broker-dealers are required to reg-
ister with FINRA and are subject to its regulation and supervision. According to 
FINRA’s official website, as of the end of 2009, it oversaw “nearly 4,800 brokerage 
firms, about 171,400 branch offices and approximately 644,000 registered securities rep-
resentatives.” See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010). 
 92. See generally, JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER DEALER 
OPERATIONS AND REGULATION UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES, CREDIT REGULATION, AND CUSTOMER PROTECTION (2009). 
 93. For instance, FINRA administers the federal scheme of licensing and examina-
tions for securities broker-dealers and their employees, while securities exchanges main-
tain listing requirements for companies issuing securities. 
 94. See 2008 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: REFORMING 
REGULATION TO BETTER PROTECT INVESTORS 8 (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
2009), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p1
19061.pdf. 
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so forth.95 Virtually every aspect of securities firms’ everyday activities, 
down to the most detailed and mundane tasks, is subject to various, fre-
quently overlapping, SRO rules.96 
The SEC exercises extensive oversight of SROs through a variety of 
mechanisms, including review and approval of SROs’ rule proposals, as 
well as any changes or amendments to their policies and procedures, and 
periodic inspections of their operations.97 The SEC has an independent 
statutory authority to regulate the activities of securities broker-dealers 
and other market intermediaries directly. However, in practice, the agen-
cy has fully delegated these regulatory functions to privately funded 
SROs, choosing instead to function as the watchful guard and supervisor 
ensuring that the SROs perform their statutory duties in an appropriate 
manner.98 
To a great extent, the U.S. system of securities SROs is a historical 
product of political compromise99 and economic expediency.100 In many 
respects, it represents “a peculiar mix of private sector self-regulation 
and delegated governmental regulation.”101 This model of financial in-
dustry self-regulation, which constitutes an integral part of the post-Great 
Depression regulatory paradigm, is fundamentally limited in its scope. 
Effectively, securities SROs operate as quasi-governmental entities per-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 95. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rules, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2010). 
 96. As part of the establishment of FINRA, the old NASD Rules and the NYSE Rules 
are in the process of being consolidated in a single rulebook, which is meant to streamline 
compliance and eliminate the unnecessary duplication of standards. See Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulation – FINRA Rules, 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/. 
 97. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing procedures for filing with 
the SEC of any proposed rule or any proposed change to the existing rules of any SRO). 
 98. The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) con-
ducts routine and special inspections of SRO regulatory and enforcement programs. See 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Compliance Inspections and Ex-
amination, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2010). 
 99. See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 89. 
 100. As one commentator put it, 
Although the premises of self-regulation have regularly been called into ques-
tion, the concept has endured because lawmakers have generally regarded self-
regulation to be a practical and efficient way to outsource the burdens of regu-
lation to the private sector. 
Dombalagian, supra note 76, at 323. 
 101. Karmel, supra note 15, at 151. 
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forming the most resource-intensive tasks “outsourced” to them by the 
SEC. 
In recent years, rapid increase in computerized trading across mar-
kets102 and a string of governance failures at major stock exchanges103 led 
to what some observers describe as an “identity crisis” of the SROs in 
the securities industry.104 A particularly intensely debated issue is the 
future of securities exchanges, which were historically the first self-
regulatory membership associations in the industry. In the past decade or 
so, securities exchanges around the world have been going through de-
mutualizations, cross-border mergers, and attempts to resolve the conflict 
of interest inherent in their dual function as a regulator and a profit-
seeking economic enterprise.105 In addition, commentators continue to 
raise serious questions about how effective and efficient the existing se-
curities industry SROs really are, particularly in light of their increasing 
bureaucratization and close integration into the federal government regu-
latory scheme.106 
In late 2004, the SEC weighed in this debate by issuing a Concept Re-
lease discussing and soliciting public comments on the potential role, 
fairness, and efficiency of the existing SRO structure in the changing 
market context.107 In its Concept Release, the SEC discussed several po-
tential structural alternatives to the current SRO system. These alterna-
tives included, among other things, the establishment of a single SRO or 
a non-industry self-regulatory body (similar to the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board formed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 102. As a result of recent technological advances, securities exchanges around the 
world are facing increasingly stiff competition from various electronic communication 
networks (“ECNs”) that are attracting a growing share of trading in listed securities. See, 
e.g., Jeremy Grant, Sweeping Changes are On the Way, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009; Mi-
chael Mackenzie, U.S.: High Frequency Trading Dominates the Debate, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2009. 
 103. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock 
Market Self-Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 59 BUS. LAW 1347 (2004). 
 104. See Dombalagian, supra note 76. 
 105. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 89; Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New 
Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008); Eric J. Pan, A European 
Solution to Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133 
(2007); Roberta Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regula-
tion of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolv-
ing World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005). 
 106. See, e.g., Dombalagian, supra note 76; Karmel, supra note 15. 
 107. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 235, 71256–71282 
(issued Dec. 8, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.pdf. 
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overseeing the entire securities industry and even the abolishment of self-
regulation in favor of direct SEC regulation and supervision.108 While 
causing quite a stir within the securities industry at the time of its publi-
cation, the SEC’s Concept Release did not lead to any fundamental 
changes in the SRO system. Serious concerns about the overall efficien-
cy and legitimacy of securities SROs continue to persist, especially in 
light of the SROs’ failure to detect and prevent major market abuses that 
led to, or were uncovered in the course of, the recent financial crisis.109 
As global financial markets evolve, driven by technological innovation, 
and as the traditional lines between financial products and institutions 
dissipate, policy-makers and academics debate the future of securities 
SROs and the ways to adapt their structure and functions to new chal-
lenges. However, these discussions generally do not address the broader 
conceptual issue of whether or not the very foundational premises of the 
existing SRO model continue to make sense in light of the regulatory 
challenges posed by the 21st century’s financial marketplace.  
 
B. Toward a New Paradigm of Financial Industry Self-Regulation 
This Article argues for the reinvention of the old concept of self-
regulation to fit the realities of today’s financial markets and to tackle the 
fundamental challenge posed by the increasing complexity and global 
scope of financial activities and products. The purpose of the following 
discussion is quite modest: to start a broader long-term conversation on 
this critically important topic by calling for a fundamental shift in our 
conception of the principal goals, scope, and function of self-regulation 
in the post-crisis financial services sector. 
1. Drawing conceptual boundaries 
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to address some fundamental de-
finitional issues and state explicitly the basic assumptions that inform the 
following discussion. 
First, it is important to re-emphasize that the notion of self-regulation 
used in this Article does not denote a system of pure private ordering of 
economic activity and complete absence of any government regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 108. Id., at 71275–71282. 
 109. Perhaps the most infamous recent example of such failure on the part of SROs is 
the scandal involving Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme that was allowed to run for years 
despite the numerous warnings. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 
Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hp. 
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intervention. Contrary to a common misperception, self-regulation is not 
identical to “de-regulation.” The concept of self-regulation advocated 
here is a significantly more complex and flexible regime combining pri-
vate rule-making by industry actors with direct government regulation. 
Secondly, this Article advocates a system of self-regulation that fun-
damentally differs from various forms of public-private partnership ar-
rangements, in which private firms participate in the process of rule-
making ultimately exercised by the government.110 To utilize fully the 
potential benefits of financial sector self-regulation, it is essential to al-
low the financial services industry to engage in promulgating and enforc-
ing the actual rules governing its members’ conduct. Similarly, self-
regulation, as that term is used in this Article, is conceptually separate 
from so-called “private regulation” where a single member of a group of 
private entities (such as credit rating agencies or outside auditors) makes 
or enforces rules applicable to the rest of that group. 
Finally, the concept of self-regulation, as used in this Article, refers to 
an industry-wide self-regulatory regime, as opposed to any form of intra-
firm governance or internal risk management. This is a critically impor-
tant distinction, because the underlying dynamics and the key factors 
determining potential success or failure of self-regulation may operate 
differently on the level of an entire industry, as opposed to an individual 
enterprise.111 
In this respect, the new model of industry self-regulation advocated 
here should not be confused with the arrangements envisioned under the 
recently revised international capital adequacy regime known as Basel 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 110. For a discussion of “negotiated rulemaking,” see, e.g., Freeman, supra note 27. 
 111. Of course, this is not to say that there are no significant parallels in this respect 
between these two forms of self-regulation. There is a rich body of scholarly analysis of 
some of the key incentives and disincentives to self-regulate on the part of individual 
firms, both in the financial sector and in other settings. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 
38; Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127 (2009); Miriam 
H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009); Macey & O’Hara, 
supra note 105. However, the insights gained from these studies, while extremely valua-
ble and informative, may not always be directly or fully applicable to analysis of indus-
try-wide self-regulatory arrangements. Incentives and disincentives facing the managers 
and stakeholders in an individual enterprise—such as a corporation complying with cor-
porate governance rules, a financial institution implementing regulators’ capital adequacy 
requirements, or a stock exchange juggling its regulatory responsibilities with its business 
interests as a profit-generating entity—may differ in certain significant respects from the 
incentives and disincentives that shape decision-making at the level of the industry as a 
collective actor. 
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II.112 Adopted in 2004, the Basel II framework allows large, internation-
ally active financial institutions to use so-called Internal Ratings-Based 
(“IRB”) approaches to calculate the amount of regulatory capital they 
must hold against their risk-weighted assets. In contrast to the original 
Basel Capital Accord of 1988 (“Basel I”), under which regulators as-
signed risk weights to specified categories of assets,113 the IRB metho-
dology essentially enables financial institutions to exercise this previous-
ly governmental function on the basis of their internal modeling. This 
system is often viewed as an example of the New Governance approach 
to capital regulation enabling private market participants to manage their 
own risks,114 endorsed by some as encouraging financial innovation and 
criticized by others as effectively removing regulatory constraints on fi-
nancial firms’ risk-taking.115 However, it is worth emphasizing that this 
particular type of regulatory devolution, while it may be conceptualized 
as a form of enterprise-level self-regulation by financial firms, is funda-
mentally different from a self-regulatory model aimed explicitly at man-
aging systemic risk, rather than enterprise risk, through an industry-wide 
self-regulatory mechanism. 
There are important practical reasons for focusing on an industry-wide 
self-regulatory regime, the most important of which relate fundamentally 
to the nature of the risk such regime is supposed to address. As the recent 
financial crisis so aptly demonstrated, placing the main regulatory focus 
solely on individual financial institutions’ internal risk management is 
not effective with respect to detection and prevention of systemic risk in 
the financial sphere.116 An individual firm managing its own risk and 
calculating its own capital requirements may very well engage in a form 
of “self-regulation” but it makes its regulatory decisions on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 112. See BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND 
CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK – COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (Basel Comm. 
on Banking Supervision, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm. 
 113. See INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS (Basel Comm., 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.htm. 
 114. See, e.g., Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Chal-
lenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy 
Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1552013##. 
 115. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 111 (criticizing the Basel II approach to operational 
risk). 
 116. For a discussion of the shortcomings of individual financial firms’ risk manage-
ment systems, see, e.g., James A. Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of 
Risk Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV 
731(2009); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Finan-
cial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 
(2009). 
700 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
comparing potential costs and benefits of each action to the firm as an 
individual profit-seeking entity. However, in today’s world of complex 
global financial transactions, potential sources of systemic crises are dif-
ficult to detect and often rooted in patterns of market interconnectedness 
that are outside any single firm’s internal governance or business activi-
ties.117 From this perspective, even the most successful regime of entity-
level self-regulation is inherently limited as a means of identifying and 
addressing the threats to the financial system as a whole. 
To summarize, the following discussion is based on the working defi-
nition of self-regulation as a regime of collective rule-making, a “regula-
tory process whereby an industry-level (as opposed to a governmental or 
firm-level) organization sets rules and standards”118 governing the beha-
vior of the members of that industry and exercises a degree of monitoring 
and enforcement of compliance with the rules.119 
Of course, this attempt to delineate the universe of self-regulatory in-
stitutions relevant for the purposes of this Article allows for an extremely 
wide variety of specific forms such institutions may take.120 Emphasizing 
collective rule-making and enforcement as the key elements of self-
regulation may merely help to define the continuum along which numer-
ous self-regulatory institutions co-exist. Nevertheless, at this initial stage 
of inquiry into the future of self-regulation in the financial services sec-
tor, attempts to develop a more specific (and therefore more rigid) defini-
tion of what constitutes self-regulation may be counterproductive and 
unnecessarily limiting. Ultimately, it is the specific design of the new 
system of financial self-regulation—its normative basis, core substantive 
principles, procedural mechanisms, and organizational structure—that 
would define its place along that continuum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 117. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 64. 
 118. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 41, at 364–65. 
 119. The concept of industry self-regulation, as used in this Article, does not encom-
pass activities of trade associations whose primary purpose and function is lobbying on 
behalf of the industry or representing the industry’s interests in political process. 
 120. For example, numerous voluntary product certification programs also set stan-
dards for individual enterprises seeking to receive certifications for their products or 
processes. See, e.g., Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Move-
ments, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 
POL. & SOC’Y 433 (2003). Different self-regulatory organizations may also differ in their 
use of coercion, or sanctions for non-compliance methods. See, e.g., Andrew A. King & 
Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s 
Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698 (2000). 
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2. Making the normative shift: “embedded self-regulation” 
From a normative perspective, the fundamental rationale for designing 
a new self-regulatory model in the financial services sector should be 
prevention of systemic risk on a global basis. As discussed above, the 
main flaw of the existing system of the U.S. securities SROs is its rela-
tively narrow scope and its focus primarily on the mundane aspects of 
securities firms’ conduct of business. By contrast, the challenge of de-
tecting and managing systemic risk in today’s complex global financial 
markets requires a qualitatively new model of financial sector self-
regulation, one that is significantly more comprehensive and systemic in 
its scope and operation. 
At the heart of the new model of financial sector self-regulation, advo-
cated here, is a fundamentally new guiding principle of “embeddedness.” 
This model of “embedded self-regulation” seeks to redefine the delicate 
balance between financial institutions’ freedom to regulate their own in-
creasingly complex activities in the most economically efficient way, on 
the one hand, and their duty to conduct their legitimate profit- and risk-
generating business in accordance with the overarching public interest in 
preserving financial stability, on the other. The goal of this model is to 
enhance the ability of private market participants to adopt and enforce 
rules governing their business activities but combine it with a greater, 
and more explicit, responsibility for the broader economic and societal 
effects of such activities. In effect, this new approach to self-regulation 
seeks to “embed” financial practices in the broader social values and 
regulatory principles, instead of “disembedding” them from the public 
interest.121 
The concept of embeddedness represents a qualitatively new approach 
to financial industry self-regulation.122 Empirical experience shows that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 121. See Rawi Abdelal & John G. Ruggie, The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: 
Social Legitimacy and Global Capitalism, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 151–62 
(David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). 
 122. To social scientists, the term “embedded self-regulation” may be reminiscent of 
Peter Evans’ classic concept of “embedded autonomy.” Examining the strategies of eco-
nomic development pursued by the East Asian “tigers,” Evans argued that the key to their 
developmental success was those states’ ability to be at once autonomous from business 
interest groups and firmly “embedded” within domestic business elites. According to 
Evans, this “embeddedness” is the key to the developmental state’s capacity to tailor its 
economic policies to local business realities and to implement its policies more effective-
ly and efficiently. See PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL 
TRANSFORMATION (1995). One may argue that, in parallel to Evans’ approach, this Ar-
ticle should use the term “embedded regulation,” instead of “embedded self-regulation,” 
to describe its normative goal. While there is a good basis for conceptualizing the envi-
sioned self-regulatory regime as a system for “embedding” government regulation in the 
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private market participants may choose to regulate their activities, either 
on an individual entity-level or collectively, for a wide variety of rea-
sons. In many contexts, private actors are motivated purely, or primarily, 
by their self-interest, such as where they introduce voluntary private reg-
ulatory mechanisms in order to increase their market share or minimize 
their transactions costs.123 These underlying objectives shape the nature 
and functions of each particular self-regulatory regime. By injecting pub-
lic policy interests directly and explicitly into the very center of the fi-
nancial industry’s self-regulatory arrangements, the model of embedded 
self-regulation seeks to redefine the broader social role of the private fi-
nancial sector and impose the primary responsibility for guarding finan-
cial stability against excessive risks on the collective creator of such 
risks. 
Of course, it may be argued that it is naïve to expect self-interested 
private parties to impose voluntary limitations on their own profit-
seeking activities for the sake of the highly diffused and indeterminate 
public benefits. There must be strong incentives to induce financial insti-
tutions to accept collective responsibility for minimizing systemic risks 
and guarding financial stability, at the expense of their individual and 
immediate profit. Given what we know about the financial industry’s 
compensation structure, governance, and overall culture, it is highly 
doubtful such incentives currently exist. In the absence of such incen-
tives, allowing the greedy and unconscious Wall Street types to run their 
own affairs may lead to greater abuses and future calamities.124 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
industry’s institutional structure and culture, doing so would shift focus to direct govern-
ment regulation as the primary object of the inquiry. In that sense, the term “embedded 
regulation” is inherently government-centered, while “embedded self-regulation” keeps 
the emphasis on the industry’s regulatory process and culture. In this context, the “em-
beddedness” is inverted: it is the industry’s governance of its own affairs that needs to be 
organically connected to, and more deeply reflective of, the broader social and regulatory 
environment in which the industry operates. 
 123. Thus, one of the best-known examples of such successful standard-setting is the 
derivatives documentation developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Associ-
ation (“ISDA”), a powerful trade association representing global derivatives industry. See 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), http://www.isda.org/ (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2010). For a detailed examination of ISDA’s development and market 
activities, see generally Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Inte-
ractions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 211 (2001). 
 124. While a healthy dose of skepticism in this respect is both justified and helpful, it 
may be overly pessimistic to dismiss entirely the potential effects of other-regarding be-
havior, which presents a powerful source of human motivation. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, 
Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE LAW 13 (John N. 
Drobak ed., 2006). 
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In order to guard against the many dangers associated with private reg-
ulation and to ensure proper functioning of this new public-minded mod-
el of financial sector self-regulation, it is critical to create and maintain a 
strong and effective system of government regulation, which defines key 
policy objectives and monitors performance of self-regulatory institu-
tions. Successful and socially useful industry self-regulation cannot be 
entirely free from government intervention but must be firmly “embed-
ded” within the system of government regulation and oversight.125 
The nature of the risk in the financial sector makes vigilant govern-
ment oversight of the industry’s self-regulatory process particularly im-
portant. In the financial sphere, there is a strong correlation between in-
dividual actor’s risks and rewards, where riskier activities tend to in-
crease a financial institution’s potential to reap higher short-term profits, 
creating powerful incentives for excessive risk-taking. Furthermore, the 
risk of a major financial meltdown is inherently systemic and may be 
triggered by events outside of any particular entity’s control.126 Finally, 
the overall risk in the financial system tends to accumulate during the 
good times of rising asset prices and soaring investor confidence, which 
may seriously constrain the industry’s ability and resolve to detect and 
lower systemic risk.127 Comprehensive government regulation and super-
vision are necessary as the principal external safeguard against these ten-
dencies and a critical check on the financial industry’s ability to regulate 
its affairs. Therefore, the search for a new model of financial sector self-
regulation, one that focuses explicitly on prevention of systemic failure 
and is embedded in the broader public interests and policy goals, should 
serve as a supplement, and not as an alternative, to the ongoing search 
for an optimal design of the government regulation and supervision of 
financial institutions and activities. Bringing these two processes togeth-
er will allow for a more comprehensive approach to regulatory reform in 
the financial sector, which will focus on designing more effective and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 125. It is often asserted that, to be successful, most systems of self-regulation have to 
operate “in the shadow of the law.” See, e.g., Michael Moran, Understanding the Regula-
tory State, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 391, 399 (2002) (describing John Braithwaite’s popular 
concept of “responsive regulation”). 
 126. See, e.g., George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, & Bank Regulation, 
16 CATO J. 17, 17–18 (1996). 
 127. See generally Esteban Pérez Caldentey, Daniel Titelman & Ramon Pineda, The 
Current Global Financial Crisis: What Was Really ‘Purely Prime’?, UNITED NATIONS, 
ECLAC (2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2009/03611.pdf; Már 
Gudmundsson, Deputy Head of the Monetary and Econ. Dep’t, Bank for Int’l Settle-
ments, How Might the Current Financial Crisis Shape Financial Sector Regulation and 
Structure?, Address at the Financial Technology Congress (Sept. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp081119.htm. 
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adaptable institutional mechanisms, organically linking the industry’s 
self-regulatory regime with the broader system of government regulation 
and oversight.128 
Both the normative and the institutional aspects of “embeddedness” are 
equally important in defining the main features of the proposed new ap-
proach to financial sector self-regulation. However, these broad concepts 
cannot possibly capture the many nuances of, nor can they offer concrete 
solutions to, the many problems and questions that are bound to arise in 
the process of actually designing an embedded self-regulatory system. 
In this regard, the normative ideal of embeddedness and the explicit 
focus on the prevention of systemic risk leave two fundamentally impor-
tant sets of questions unanswered. The first such set of questions relates 
to the incentive structure and asks what would drive the financial servic-
es industry to establish or embrace a system of self-regulation envisioned 
in this Article. This line of inquiry comprises many questions. What are 
the general preconditions for the emergence of a self-regulatory regime 
seeking explicitly to minimize potentially harmful external effects of pri-
vate economic actors’ behavior? Do such preconditions exist in the con-
text of today’s financial services industry? Which specific factors may 
potentially facilitate or, conversely, impede the emergence of an indus-
try-wide consensus on the necessity of self-regulation aimed at minimiz-
ing systemic risk? How can a broader regulatory reform create the miss-
ing incentives for the financial services industry to adopt, or accept, a 
shift toward embedded self-regulation?129 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 128. Of course, this approach also introduces an element of complexity. Establishing a 
truly effective regime of embedded self-regulation in the financial sector may require a 
great deal of creativity and intricate regulatory “engineering” to overcome potential con-
flicts of interest inherent in a self-regulatory regime and to assure a sufficient degree of 
transparency and accountability. For instance, to make this self-regulatory model work, it 
may be necessary to reorder the existing division of regulatory and supervisory authority 
among government agencies overseeing financial sector and rewrite significantly numer-
ous substantive rules and regulations governing delivery of financial services. 
 129. One example of potential structural reform aimed at creating incentives for self-
regulation may be redrawing of regulatory boundaries within the financial services indus-
try in such a way that would realign institutions based on the types of their business activ-
ities and the risks inherent in such activities. Such regulatory regrouping of financial 
institutions based on their risk profile, rather than the type of license or legal status (as, 
e.g., a commercial bank or a securities broker-dealer), could potentially help to ensure 
greater homogeneity of interests and create a stronger sense of common destiny among 
the relevant private industry actors. Another potential step in this direction may be elimi-
nation of, or imposition of strict limits on, explicit federal subsidies and implicit bailout 
guarantees to certain types of financial institutions whose activities generate the bulk of 
financial systemic risk. I explore these and related issues as part of a separate project that 
focuses more specifically on the issue of incentives for self-regulation in the financial 
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The second key inquiry aims at the efficacy of the proposed regime 
and asks how exactly that system should be structured and operated in 
order to achieve its proclaimed normative goals and not fall prey to con-
flicts of interest and abusive behavior on the part of the industry actors. 
This is perhaps the most challenging and complicated line of inquiry 
dealing with a wide variety of organizational as well as substantive regu-
latory issues. How should the new self-regulatory body be organized and 
governed? What is the optimal scope of its functions and powers, both 
with respect to rule-making and implementation and enforcement? What 
specific methods for monitoring and minimizing systemic risk will such 
a self-regulatory body employ and how will it ensure their efficacy? 
What institutional safeguards should be put in place to prevent “capture” 
of a self-regulatory authority by self-serving industry members threaten-
ing to subvert its normative goals? What is the optimal mechanism for 
linking the new self-regulatory regime with the broader government reg-
ulation? How much, and what type of, oversight should the government 
exercise over the industry self-regulatory body? 
An important issue in this respect is to what extent the existing system 
of securities SROs can serve as the basis for the new, redesigned and 
refocused, self-regulatory regime. Is it possible, and indeed desirable, to 
retain the existing SRO system in some form alongside a new, more 
comprehensive self-regulatory scheme aimed explicitly at systemic risk 
concerns? If so, how would that affect the process of redrawing regulato-
ry and supervisory boundaries in the post-crisis financial services sector? 
Of course, these are only some of the fundamentally important and 
highly complex questions that must be addressed in the process of craft-
ing a truly effective regime of embedded self-regulation in the financial 
services sector. Both of these broadly defined areas of inquiry defy easy 
answers and require a great deal of research and discussion, which is 
beyond the scope of this initial foray into the empirically rich and intel-
lectually challenging topic of financial industry self-regulation. 
This Article presents a case for radically broadening the scope of what 
we traditionally view, at least in this country, as financial industry self-
regulation. Whatever its ultimate institutional shape, the basic concept of 
embedded self-regulation advanced here denotes a paradigmatic shift in 
that view. It calls for altering the primary focus of self-regulation from 
policing financial firms’ conduct of business, or even individual enter-
prise-level safety and soundness, to a much more comprehensive notion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
industry. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial 
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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of systemic risk prevention explicitly embedded in the broader public 
policy interests. 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s post-crisis world, arguing in favor of self-regulation in the 
financial services industry is sure to raise many eyebrows and invite sig-
nificant disagreement. Much of the skepticism in this respect may be ful-
ly justified: the lack of truly effective incentives or political obstacles 
may ultimately foreclose the possibility of creating a new regime of em-
bedded self-regulation aimed at detection and prevention of systemic 
financial risks. Nevertheless, as this Article sought to demonstrate, the 
realities of today’s financial marketplace make it critically important that 
we give the idea of industry self-regulation a full consideration. 
The main goal of this Article was to start this deliberative process by 
making a general case for reinventing financial sector self-regulation. 
There are compelling reasons to believe that private financial market par-
ticipants are potentially in a far better position to address the two prin-
cipal regulatory challenges currently facing governments around the 
globe: the increasing complexity and global nature of financial transac-
tions and instruments. Leveraging private industry’s potential capacity to 
manage systemic risk would require giving financial institutions greater 
self-regulatory authority, while at the same time imposing direct, and 
very real, responsibility on the industry actors to curb their own profit-
seeking activities to the extent they may endanger broader societal inter-
est in preserving long-term financial stability. “Responsibilizing” the 
industry in this manner must be an inalienable element of any regulatory 
reform granting or expanding financial industry’s freedom to regulate its 
own activities. 
This Article does not offer a fully developed set of concrete reform 
proposals—a complicated and multi-faceted task that requires a great 
deal of further research and analysis. Instead, it represents a pure thought 
experiment seeking to broaden the scope of the ongoing debate on regu-
latory reform in the financial sector and to initiate a meaningful discus-
sion of all potential solutions to the fundamental problem of containing 
systemic risk in global financial markets. 
 
